Lord Moran's memoir: shell-shock and the pathology of fear Carl May PhD J R Soc Med 1998;91:95-100 In the autumn of 1914 a young regimental medical officer in the British Army in France had his first experience of what he subsequently came to realize was a new kind of illness. Called by a company commander to examine a sergeant who appeared 'morose' and apathetic, he recorded that: 0 H H-OUM 95
I found him staring into the fire. He had not shaved and his trousers were half open. I could get nothing out of him ... he did not appear to be ill. We agreed to let him rest, to let him stay in his billet till the battalion came out of the trenches. But next day when everyone had gone up the line he blew his head off. I thought little of it at the time, it seemed a silly thing to do'. Charles (later Lord) Moran served in the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) on the Western Front throughout the First World War. The diary that he kept formed the basis of a book which dissects fear as both a moral problem for the military and a practical problem for medical knowledge and practice in the context of total war. In it, Moran finds his moral judgments about the terrorized soldier constantly in tension with his medical knowledge, and thus wrestles with the contending problems of susceptibility and culpability that had dogged medical analyses of social behaviour for the preceding century, and which do so to this day. Moran 's book has been held up by some authors as a seminal intervention in understanding the stresses encountered on the modern battlefield. One such commentator, for example, characterizes it as 'a brilliant fusion of. . . experiences as a regimental medical officer on the western front with a wider conceptualization of courage'2. Undoubtedly it is a powerful narrative. But what gives it its power is not that it answers the question that the author begins with, but rather the extent to which it gives character to the extent of medical disagreement about the nature of shell shock. In this essay, I use Moran's memoir to explore the tensions between social judgments about culpability and clinical assessments of susceptibility in the medical analysis of a new illness, 'shell shock' or 'war strain'; and to examine the way in which these tensions shifted the definition of courage itself, from individual acts of physical heroism to endurance in the face of random annihilation.
MEDICINE AND SHELL SHOCK: THE CLINICAL DEBATE
The war of 1914-1918 was a kind of war quite new to European societies: it was total in scale, demanding the whole resources of the state and industry, and consuming enormous numbers of men. It was novel, too, in its static nature: between the winter of 1914 and the spring of 1918 the scale of advance and retreat for either side could be measured in a few miles. As the battlefield became defined by trenchworks and defensive entanglements, so it became a battlefield in depth, in which the principal weapon of defence and attack was bombardment by high explosives rather than individual infantry and cavalry weapons. Such weapons were indiscriminate in their effects, and those exposed to them risked terrible wounds and death by annihilation.
For a generation schooled into thinking that individual heroism and physical courage were the principal moral virtues in war3, this kind of battlefield offered individuals a problem in assessing their own role. Personal courage was often rendered meaningless in an industrialized war where the enemy was often unseen and was normally spatially remote, and where artillery destroyed the very landscape in which the soldier found himself. It is not surprising, therefore, that this kind of warfare generated a new kind of psychological casualty in considerable numbers. This was recognized quite early in the war, and was described by Elliot, an RAMC subaltern, who contrasted 'true' and 'hysterical' paraplegia amongst men caught by artillery fire in December 1914.
Functional disorders of the nervous system are far from rare in the fright caused by a big shell explosion, and they assume very diverse forms. The man may become blind or deaf, or dumb; he may be seized by a violent and coarse tremor that shakes his body for days; or he may be paralysed with a hemiplegia or paraplegia4.
From the first, then, the sudden terror caused by shell explosions was seen to be the cause of 'hysterical' disorders. 'Shell shock' was thus used in its literal sense, but from the very outset raised questions about the moral state of the sufferer. A year after the sergeant's suicide, and after experiencing the 'corrosion' of the battlefield, Moran wrote1: I began to wonder whether I had been responsible for this fellow's end, if he should have been sent down the line sick. It was plain he could not face war and was not certain what he might do and had taken the matter into his own hands before he did something dreadful that might bring disgrace upon himself and on the regiment.
The question was, however, what kind of sickness was involved here. Neurasthenia (a generalized state of anxiety and depression) and hysteria were staples of pre-war psychiatry. The twenty years before the war had seen debate and contest about whether these could be explained through neurological knowledge about the structure and functioning of the central nervous system; whether they were explicable entirely in psychological terms; or whether they were 'real' disorders at alls.
These contests were quickly translated into debates about the aetiology and natural history of shell shock through the work of three principal protagonists-Sir Frederick Mott, in peacetime pathologist to the London County Asylum and a leading neurologist, who had been commissioned as an RAMC major; Lt Col Charles Myers, RAMC, who in peacetime had directed the experimental psychology establishment at Cambridge University and who had been commissioned as consultant psychologist to the British Army in France; and Professor George Elliott Smith, Professor of Anatomy and Dean of Medicine at Manchester University. During the spring of 1916, they all three published papers in The Lancet offering novel hypotheses about the causes of shell shock and the treatment of the shell shocked soldier. This had become an urgent problem during the course of 1915, after a series of battles had led to several thousand diagnoses of 'shell shock' of neurasthenic or hysterical origin.
At the root of the debate that followed was a process in which a distinction was drawn between fear as a normative state and fear as a pathological response to the stresses of the modem battlefield. In 1914, Elliot4 had sought to distinguish between 'true' and 'hysterical' consequences of proximity to shell explosions, setting up a dichotomy between organic injury and psychological effect. Mott68 began from a similar position, by examining the question of men who had died in action without any visible injury and undertaking post-mortem examinations of two such throughout the central nervous system, and Mott hypothesized that their deaths had been caused by either trauma (the shock wave from the shell explosion either having dislocated the neuron pathways within them or having caused atmospheric compression and decompression so rapidly that they had died instantly of 'the bends'), or by carbon monoxide poisoning from the exhaust gasses that such explosions left behind. Death, he argued, was the result of organic injury.
Mott initially stressed 'commotional' rather than 'emotional' shock. The former appeared to mimic symptoms that were attributed to neurasthenia and hysteria (depression, anxiety, delusions, cognitive impairment, paralysis) because the substance of the central nervous system was damaged. But he was then left with the problem of explaining post-trauma recovery amongst those who were not killed by shell explosions. This he did by equally novel means, at first hypothesizing that neurons had the capacity to behave in an amoeboid way, acting independently to reconnect themselves and so to reconstitute the pathways through which nervous impulses passed. Moreover, neurons themselves, he suggested, acted like batteries, storing psychic energy. When the neuron pathways were restored to their former state this energy could be released, and the individual became normal. Even at the outset, however, Mott did not entirely discount psychogenic causes for shell shock, though he placed the greatest emphasis on physical trauma. This was the subject of considerable disagreement, not necessarily about Mott's hypothesis of organic cause, but also his explanation for recovery, as a respectful but sceptical Lancet editorial accompanying his articles suggested9. Like Moran, Myers kept a diary which he also used as the basis for a subsequent book. Myers was, in 1916, an active proponent of a model of shell shock that related it to the subject's previous psychological history:
In the vast majority of cases, the signs of shell shock (apart from shell concussion) appear traceable to psychical causes, especially, in the early cases to the emotions of extreme and sudden horror or fright. . . Previous emotional disorder, worry, insomnia, and above all, a psycho-neurotic predisposition favour the onset of the shock and help to determine the nature of the mental and nervous sequelae'0.
To explain the physical pain experienced by some sufferers, Myers proposed that shell shocked soldiers utilized unconscious memories of previous pain or disorder which were reinstated by the effects of the exploding shell: 'In a considerable number of cases the site of the sensory disorder caused by the shock was determined by a previous casualties. The latter revealed minute haemorrhages history of pain in that region'14. Myers' concerns about the 96 notion of a disposition to psychoneurotic symptoms reflect, too, the important place that he had occupied in the prewar eugenics movement. 'Fitness' for combat thus had more than a physiological or psychological implication in the analysis of writers such as Myers: it also carried the weight of ideas about heredity and degeneration.
The differences between Mott and Myers were perhaps not as great as some commentators have subsequently suggested: both distinguished between 'commotional' and 'emotional' shock; and, just as Mott recognized that some soldiers suffered shock of psychological cause, Myers rather unwillingly admitted the plausibility of both Mott's gas poisoning thesis and his compression/decompression thesis.
The debate between Mott and Myers exemplified contests between neurological and psychological explanations of behaviour that characterized much medical debate in the pre-war period. So it is ironic that it was an anatomist, Elliott Smith, who argued most cogently from the outset that 'the real trauma is psychical, not physical'12.
Elliott Smith set out a truly psychological view of shell shock, or, as he preferred to call it 'war strain', as the result of attrition of the self, suffered by men who, after spending months in the firing line exposed to every kind of discomfort and anxiety which modem trench warfare imposes, and after having their deepest emotions repeatedly stirred by the death of comrades and the repeated reminders of their own peril, were struck down by shell concussion12.
These experiences were quite sufficient to explain the neurasthenic and hysterical symptoms experienced by those who were shell shocked, and the psychological stresses that they represented could not be understood in terms of a single causal event. Instead, they were the product of long exposure to horror. Nor was it the case that genetic disposition was sufficient to explain psychological collapse.
[N]ever before in the history of mankind have the stresses and strains laid upon the body or the mind been so great or so numerous as in the present war. We may therefore expect to find many cases which present not a single disease, not even a mixture, but rather a chemical compound of diseases, so to speak13. Elliott Smith grasped the point that total war exposed individuals to strains and stresses that had never before been experienced. In static warfare there was simply no escape from the effects of battle and its psychological impact. The latter was manifest not in a single disease entity but as a syndrome.
Ultimately, almost all medical writers on shell shock were forced to adopt such a position. In part, this was because it had become apparent that such symptoms were they were increasingly found in men who had not even approached the front line, but simply dreaded doing so. By 1918, Mott had abandoned his organic hypotheses in favour of the argument that 'the psychogenic or auto-suggestive factor ... is the chief determining cause of war-neuroses' 14.
THE PROBLEM OF COURAGE
The shift to understanding shell shock as the result of psychological attrition, rather than as the product of a single causal event, was crucial in changing the way in which treatment was organized. Subsequent histories and a series of influential biographies and autobiographies of the war poets-have celebrated the role of therapists such as W H R Rivers at Craiglockhart Hydro in Edinburgh, in bringing a psychotherapeutic sensibility to bear on pathological terror of the kind embedded in medical definitions of shell shock. In the line, however, the kinds of therapeutic practices employed by Rivers (and by a very large number of less celebrated RAMC officers) had little practical utility. In such circumstances the judgments that were made reflected the need to assess the moral as well as the clinical condition of the soldier. This started, Moran noted, from a position of scientific ignorance:
In 1914, apart from William James's analysis of fear, there was no book in the English language on the psychology of the sollier. Men were not interested in the psychology of courage and fear. Wells, In his Research Magnificent had to go into the jungle to illustrate fearthe fear of animals1.
Courage, of course, remained the normative expec'tation of the fighting man. But the way in which courage itself was conceptualized changed: it shifted from episodic physical heroism to stoical endurance, and adjustment to powerlessness. The individual soldier on the Western Front often appeared to have little effect on the outcome of anything; his actions only became meaningful in relation to group memberships, and yet the group was often annihilated in the most random way. Individuals faced the prospect of weeks and months of physical and psychological hardship followed by a random, meaningless and repulsive death. To turn again to Moran's account:
There were men in France who were ready to go out, but who could just not face death in that shape. They were prepared for it if it came swiftly and decently. But that shattering, crude, bloody end by a big shell was too much for them. It was something more than death, all their plans for meeting it with decency and credit were suddenly battered down; it was not so much as [sic] their lives were in danger as that their self-respect had gone out of their hands. They were at the crisis of their lives dishevelled, plastered with mud and blood; their actions at the mercy of others, they were no longer certain of what they might do1. not confined to those who had been exposed to shell fire; Whilst those who were establishing themselves as clinical experts on the topic of shell shock began with the problem of how to conceptualize it as a disease state, Moran's task as a regimental medical officer was rather different. His objective was to keep men in the line where possible, rather than free them from its horrors. Early in his book he characterizes this in terms of having to 'value the assets' of his unit, and in practice as well as in theory, this involved making social judgments about individuals' moral states. To do this, he relied on a crude typology:
There seemed to be four degrees of courage and four orders of men measured by that standard. Men who dlid not feel fear; men who felt fear but did not show it; men who felt fear and showed it but did their job; men who felt fear, showe(d it, and shirked. At Ypres [19151 I was beginning to realise that few men spent their trench lives with their feet firmly planted on one rung of this ladder.1
Moran begins by contrasting the courage of 'sensitive' men 'for whom ... war was purgatory, who yet contrived a mask of indifference . .. and were put in a position of authority over others'l with unfeeling courage. This distinction between the sensitivity of the boyish officer who would ultimately be subject to 'moods' of anxiety, and the unfeeling nature of enlisted men, runs through Moran's account. He falls back on a kind of Arcadian mythology here, one that relies not simply on the distinction between gentlemen officers and labouring enlisted men, but also between town and country.
[T]here is evidence as far as it is possible to identify in their ancient setting soldiers blessed by natural courage that the armies of long ago were recruited from men who did not feel fear. Their courage seems to have its roots in a vacant mind. Their imagination played no tricks. They drew no picture of their own undoing.... Phlegm, that was the yokel's virtue, it was the distinctive quality of his race.1
And later
If natural courage, the courage of insensibility, was almost extinct among officers, was that apathy as rare among the men? Were their hides no thicker? It is true that the change in them was less complete. There were whole battalions recruited among yokels, such as the 9th Sussex, where the men did not seem to think at all'.
These kinds of description tell us a good deal about the way in which social class formed a basis for judgments about moral and intellectual character in late Edwardian Britain. Such judgments run through the war literature, although normally in rather less acute forms. The 'child-like' nature and 'innocence' of the private soldier is a staple of the autobiographies of the war poets, for example. But Moran's judgments are more literal, and they form the centre of an analysis of courage as the mastery of knowledge and imagination, and fear whether normal or pathological-as the product of inability to exercise that mastery.
PATHOLOGICAL FEAR AS A FAILURE OF WILL
The medicalization of shell shock, albeit along class lines (with neurasthenia apparently located amongst officers and hysteria largely confined to enlisted men), had some important benefits for sufferers. It to some degree absolved them of moral responsibility for their condition, if not for their recovery. (Similarly, an amendment to existing legislation protected them from being certified insane.) It thus saved many men from capital court martial for desertion, cowardice or otherwise 'misbehaving' in the face of the enemy. All of these, in theory and practice, carried the death penalty. Nearly 400 executions were performcd, and it was well understood during and immediately after the war that a substantial proportion of those executed had suffered undiagnosed shell shockl5. But whatever the debates that took place out of the line, Moran took a firmly moral view of the shell-shocked soldier.
Such men went about wearing labels for all to read. From the first they were unable to stand this test of men. They had about them the marks known to our calling of the incomplete man, the stamp of degeneracyl.
Similarly,
It cannot be denied that any man may be brought down to the coward's level by physical hurt . .. But the two conditions-emotional and commotional shock can be kept apart and it is vital to do so, for when a man is hit he deserves more consideration than when he is frightened'.
It is readily apparent that Moran sets up a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate conditions here, and there is no reason to believe that his attitude however hardened by the intervening years was particularly unusual. Stone16, in his discussion of the social construction of shell shock, has shown how both its experience, diagnosis and treatment all revolved around the systematic exploitation of ideas about group membership and moral obligation to the unit, and in particular to masculine values centred on notions of 'duty'. Away from the front, Myers offered a similar set of judgments:
Of 'nervous' subjects, however, two types must be recognised, the good and the bad; the former, often a highly intelligent person, keeping full control over his unduly sensitive nervous system; the latter, usually of feebler intellect, having little hold over his instinctive acts to escape danger, the emotions that impel him, and the resulting conflicts ie As far as Moran was concerned, mastery of fear in conditions where fear was a natural response to the constant threat of annihilation, was a primary component both of manhood and of duty. He describes sharing a dugout with a young officer, who by day was 'gay' and 'irresponsible'. One night Moran was ... aroused from my sleep by his shouts and yells. I went to wake him; then with my hand on his shoulder I stopped. He would not wish to share this secret with anyone. A week later, while I was still wondering what to do, death came quietly and set him free. . . He knew fear, but he knew too that it could never say to him do this and do that; the terror that dogs a man when he has come to doubt his power to remain master of his ways was kept away from him by the pride and habit of his race1.
Discipline, self-control, and conscious mastery of the imagination are the tools that Moran relies upon to control the onset of pathological fear. A man who suffered shell shock deserved 'less consideration' than one who was physically wounded, not because he was psychologically damaged, but because this was consequent on personal moral failure. Courage, in this context, was construed as the conscious endurance of physical and psychological attrition. Pathological fear, either in the form of neurasthenic 'moods' and anxieties or as hysterical reactions, was the evidence of the soldier's failure to master the self, and to draw sufficient willpower to continue to do his duty. Most importantly, it was evidence of the failure to keep imagination at bay, hence his apparently odd comment noted earlier about the intellectual vacancy of the 'yokel' soldier. Moran is quite clear about this:
Courage is a moral quality; it is not a chance gift of nature like an aptitude for games. It is a cold choice . .. an act of renunciation which must be made not once but many times by the power of the will. Courage is willpower'.
It is apparent that Moran was greatly influenced by William James's Principles of Psychology, published in abridged form in 190817. James emphasized the role of 'coarser' and 'subtler' emotions in constructing experience, and the importance of the 'subtler' emotions in overcoming base instincts. James regarded those 'subtler' emotions not as innate but as the product of training. Most importantly, this provided Moran with a justification for both his division by class between sensitive officers and brutish men and his notion that fearful instincts could be overcome by renunciation. A man could train himself, or be trained, to overcome base emotions such as fear. A similar view prevails at various points in Myers' account, but one which 'feebleness'. Such views themselves carried great weight in the pre-war period, when 'moral continence' and selfcontrol were invoked as the primary source of mental health. The 'sensitive' classes were commonly understood to be more likely to become insane from causes of a 'moral' or 'intellectual' nature, such as grief or anxiety precisely because their habits were more moderate and temperate, and because of their greater discipline and self-control. The labouring classes were more likely to be imprudent and subject to libidinous desires-'base' instincts that they could not, or would not, bring under their control. Those who occupied the social strata characterized by intellectual 'feebleness' were simply unable to do so18.
Moran's distinction between legitimate and illegitimate symptoms relies on neurasthenic shell shock appearing to be most evident amongst the officer class. This apparently provided him with some evidence for his distinction between the sensitive (and thus imaginative) young officer and the more primitive intellect of the private soldier. But there is a more mundane explanation for this too. Officers may simply have had more freedom to consult the medical officer (and be more likely to have been taken seriously when they did); and, since they belonged to the same Mess, to have been informally observed and diagnosed by him. In Moran's own account, enlisted men certainly had fewer opportunities to do this and seem to have been taken less seriously when they described neurasthenic symptoms.
Whatever moral judgments Moran offered about the shell-shocked soldier, he was also forced in retrospect to account for the constant failure of courage amongst those who seemed to him to possess the many virtues that best adjusted them to combat. Like Mott, he draws on the analogy of a reserve of psychological energy:
The story of how courage was spent in France is a picture of sensitive men using up their willpower under discouraging circumstances while one by one their moral props were knocked down. The call on the bank might only be the daily strain of the trenches or it might be the sudden draft which threatened to close the account. The acid test of a man in the trenches was high explosive; it told us things about ourselves we had not known till then'. The notion that courage was a moral (or psychological) reserve that could be drained by the experience of the war was a common one. Writing home in 1917, a US Army medical officer serving with a British regiment noted that:
There is a great difference of opinion about the nature of shell shock, many claiming that it has no 'nature' at all but is purely a condition of 'scaredness'. Perhaps in a certain number of cases that is true. . but it has always appeared to me from cases that I saw in England and later at the front that it was what one might call 'nerve exhaustion'. Each individual has a certain amount of 'reserve nerve power', more for some than for others. As this reserve is used up is modified by notions of the genetic origins of intellectual under great stress, such as soldiers passing through battle, some reached their limit sooner than others and develop 'shell shock', though perhaps no shell has lit particularly close to them'9.
When Moran described his own experience of close bombardment, however, it was a traumatic episode-the 'sudden draft on the bank', as it were-that struck at his will to discipline himself against fear. My mind became a complete blank. I had a feeling as if I had suffered physical hurt though I was not touched, the will to do the right thing was for the moment stunned. I could not think at all. I was dazed and at the mercy of those instincts which till then I had been able to fight'.
Subsequently, this experience haunted him: he joined the ranks of those who had become nervous and suffered nightmares. The whole tone of his narrative changes at this point, becoming more sympathetic to the psychological suffering of the shell-shocked soldier through the medium of his own recollection of what was, without doubt, a traumatic experience of a scale few contemporary readers can imagine. He observed that, under such stress, 'Men wear out in war like clothes'. CONCLUSION Because much of Moran's book relies on a reconstruction of his diaries, there is a sense in which it conveys the way in which thinking about shell shock itself changed through the war-moving from the distinction between commotional and emotional shock embodied in the work of Mott and Myers, towards the 'war strain' hypothesis suggested by Elliot. Men truly were driven mad by the experience of the battlefield, and others into a psychological decline in which their memories haunted them for their whole lives. The best that men could hope for was to endure and persevere.
